This does, however, reinforce the need for domain administrators to be very careful when establishing trust relationships with other domains, and only grant trust to domains that truly are trustworthy.
What's the solution to the vulnerability? Microsoft has developed a mechanism called SID Filtering to eliminate the vulnerability.
When SID Filtering is installed on the domain controllers in a trusting domain, and enabled for a specific trusted domain, it has the effect of establishing a "quarantine" on the trusted domain. Thereafter, the trusting domain checks all incoming authorization data from that trusted domain and removes any SIDs that don't belong to it.
For instance, suppose SID Filtering were installed and enabled on the domain controllers in Domain B from the previous example. Once the patch is installed, is SID Filtering enabled by default? As we'll discuss in more detail below, SID Filtering should only be enabled on particular domain controllers, and even then only after careful consideration of how it will affect your network.
At a high level, though, in Windows NT 4. To protect a domain, you only need to enable SID Filtering on the domain controllers. Member servers and workstations in the domain do not use or implement SID Filtering. You do, however, need to ensure you have enabled SID Filtering on all domain controllers in the domains you want to protect. If you miss one domain controller server, it might be possible for an attacker to exploit the vulnerability via that computer. SID Filtering should only be applied to external trusts -- that is, trust relationships between domains that are not in the same forest.
It should not be applied to trust relationships within a forest, as doing so will block replication and other functions that are essential to the proper operation of forest.
If a domain is sufficiently untrustworthy to warrant applying SID Filtering to it, it really should not be a member of the forest. Are there any drawbacks associated with using SID Filtering? This does effectively screen out all falsified SIDs, but it will also screen out legitimate SIDs that simply do not come from the originating domain. Two cases in which this can interfere with legitimate operation are:.
There are two particularly useful references that we recommend reading:. Included in the Windows NT 4. Included in the Windows NT Server 4. The fix for this issue is included in Windows Security Roll-up Package 1. Patches for Windows Datacenter Server are hardware-specific and available from the original equipment manufacturer. To verify that the Windows NT 4.
To verify that SID Filtering is enabled on the machine, confirm that the following registry key is present and that it contains the NetBIOS names of the domains to quarantine:. To verify that Windows Security Roll-up Package 1 has been installed on the machine, confirm that the following registry key has been created on the machine:.
Localized versions of the Windows NT 4. Microsoft thanks the following customers for reporting this issue to us and working with us to protect customers:. The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind.
Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
The information contained in an XML document can be easily passed between applications and systems and can be displayed in Web browsers without difficulty. The complexity and volume of information now available on the Web has given rise to the popularity of XML as a means of sharing information. XML is also used as a means to transfer information between databases and other data repositories.
The owner of a website may choose to deliver information using XML. Another common use is for posting XML data to a web server. The response could also be an error message, saying the data stream is not available, or the response could take the form of a redirect to a data stream in a different location.
The problem is that the security settings of the response are not checked. What do you mean by "security settings"? Specifically, when visiting an Internet web site, the control should respect the Internet Zone's prohibition against accessing data on user's system.
The vulnerability results because it doesn't do this. Under most conditions, this flaw doesn't pose a threat. The control does examine the web site's request, and will refuse to carry it out if it requests a local file. However, it's possible to disguise a request in such a way to prevent the control from recognizing that it's a request for a local file, and then exploit the vulnerability.
What would this enable an attacker to do? An attacker could use this vulnerability to read a file from the other user's system. The attacker would be unable to search the user's disk for files, so the full path and file name would need to be known beforehand. However, many system files reside in default locations. How might an attacker exploit this vulnerability? An attacker could seek to exploit the vulnerability by first building a web page that includes an XMLHTTP GET call to another page that has been specially malformed using a server side application technology.
If a user visited the attacker's web site, the redirection through the specially malformed page could allow the attacker to read data from the user's system. Does this mean that anyone who is using these versions of Windows or Office needs the patch? MDAC is a ubiquitous technology that is included with many Microsoft products:. A tool is also available that can help you determine what version of MDAC is running on your system. Microsoft Knowledge Base Article describes this tool and how to use it.
How does the patch eliminate the vulnerability? The patch institutes proper buffer handling in the vulnerable function. This patch has been superceded by the patch in MS Users should apply MS , which also contains a fix for an additional security vulnerability. Please refer to the "Patch Availability" section of MS for the download location of that patch.
Please refer to the "Additional Information" section of MS for installation platform information for this patch. The fix for this issue will be included in MDAC 2. The fix is included in MDAC 2. Microsoft Knowledge Base article provides a file manifest that can be used to verify the patch installation. This patch is superseded by the security patch for MS Users should apply the patch that is included in MS Localized versions of this patch are available at the locations that are discussed in the "Patch Availability" section of this bulletin.
The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In addition, it is possible that they could change the operation of the SNMP service. Because it runs as part of the operating system, this would potentially give the attacker complete control over the system.
Who could exploit the vulnerability? How difficult would it be for the attacker to deliver SNMP Management requests to an affected system? However, if normal firewalling has been performed, it might be impossible for an attacker located on the Internet to deliver management requests to a system behind the firewall, as standard firewalling recommendations include blocking UDP ports and , the ports over which SNMP traffic travels.
How likely is it that a web server or other Internet-exposed system would be vulnerable? Just follow the steps for the system you're using. Just follow the steps for the system you're using only if the service was running before and you want it to run again. I haven't installed the SNMP service on my system. Am I at any risk? You're only at risk if the SNMP service is running. What does the patch do?
The patch eliminates the vulnerability by instituting proper input checking on the command parser in the SNMP agent service. I downloaded the Windows NT 4. You should download the updated patches and use those to update your system. I installed the earlier version of these patches on my system, what do I need to do? Once you've downloaded the updated patch, you can apply that to your system. It will overwrite the previous version of the patch.
There is no need to uninstall the previous version. I've downloaded a Windows NT 4. The problem only affects the patches in English and German. Patches in other languages do not suffer from this problem and do not need to be re-downloaded or re-applied. The Windows NT 4.
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